With Spies Like These…
America is not a country which has ever had high regard for intelligence work. The public’s image of spies has tended more towards Chevy Chase in the 1985 comedy, “Spies Like Us” than Sean Connery in “From Russia with Love.”
Indeed America’s most famous intelligence officer, Nathan Hale, whose statue resides outside the CIA’s Langley headquarters, is primarily remembered for the manner in which he was caught and executed. But when events strike us unaware with tragic results, pundits are quick to blame “intelligence failures.” This level of examination is about as useful as the mechanic telling you that your car will not start because it is broken. In the case of the Afghanistan bombing by an Al Qaeda double-agent which killed four CIA officers, three CIA security contractors and a Jordanian intelligence official, this rote criticism is not sufficient.
What we know is that suicide bomber Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi was a Jordanian doctor, initially recruited by Jordanian intelligence, who apparently believed they had successfully “turned him” from a Jihadist to an “asset.” He was then loaned out to the CIA to assist in locating Al Qaeda #2 man, Ayman Al-Zawahiri.
We are told that Al-Balawi was providing “actionable intelligence,” to the CIA, which led to targeted strikes against several lower level Al Qaeda operatives in the region. According to the New York Times, Al-Balawi was considered the agency’s “best source in years.” Because of this, Al- Balawi was apparently not “fluttered” (polygraphed in agency jargon), and was allowed to by-pass security checkpoints (Although this claim is disputed by CIA director Panetta.) This comes despite the fact that Al-Balawi was known to be participating in online jihadist forums, and the bomber’s wife, who resides in Turkey, also a known Islamist, says she is proud of her jihadist husband, “who was an enemy of America.”
Following the bombing, a video of the double-agent bomber was released, in which Al-Balawi called for vengeance against America for the targeted killing of Pakistan Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud. It is not surprising that the Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for this attack. The Pakistani branch of the Al Qaeda- Taliban axis has overseen a number of devastating attacks against high security Pakistani targets, including a siege of a military command center and suicide bombing killing Pakistani intelligence officers.
Did Al Balawi simply balk at spying for the West at some point after his recruitment such that he was persuaded back into the service of Islamic terrorism, or was he a long term plant established by Al Qaeda/Taliban/Haqqani Network to work his way close to the CIA officers who were directing the targeted strikes? The later possibility is the more dangerous one. If it is true, it means that the opposition was able to set up a long-term, months (possibly years) long operation to infiltrate both Jordanian and American intelligence. It would have required that they were exceedingly patient as well as willing to allow Al Balawi to release at least some real information which apparently led to some members of their organization being killed in airstrikes, in order to solidify their agent’s cover.
Americans are often quick to blame themselves for failures. While a critical examination of one’s mistakes is necessary for success, it can also be a symptom of another mistake, that of underestimating the adversary.
We should be willing to give credit to the enemy when it is due. The Al Balawi operation was a success for our enemies. It took advantage of the Jordanian-CIA cooperation, which has been described by some intelligence professionals as being a handicap in so far as American officers are often forced to rely on Jordanian judgment because the Americans lack cultural and language knowledge of the Islamist enemy. The announcement of the death of the Jordanian officer has since become fodder for the Kingdom’s political opposition. It took advantage also of the great pressure the CIA has placed upon it to provide “actionable intelligence,” that is intelligence which can be translated into arrests or targeted killings of terrorists. It took advantage of the well known difficulty that America has faced regarding its counterintelligence. Throughout the Cold War, American intelligence has long struggled with long-term moles like Aldrich Ames (CIA) and Robert Hanssen (FBI).
Part of the problem is a fundamental lack of understanding by the intelligence community regarding the nature of our enemies and the culture from which they spring. That was the criticism of Major General Michael Flynn, deputy chief of staff for intelligence in Afghanistan, who criticized U.S Intelligence officials as, “ignorant of local economics and landowners, hazy about who the powerbrokers are and how they might be influenced…and disengaged from people in the best position to find answers…” in a report issued by the Center for a New American Security. One operations officer in the report went so far as to call the U.S effort, “clueless.”
U.S Intelligence does not seem to understand the Taliban/Al Qaeda Jihadist ideology, or the culture from which it is derived. Would they recognize Al-Balawi’s infiltration in the Islamic context, as a successful implementation of Taqiyya? Compare Al Balawi’s case with the following hadith (tradition of the prophet Mohammad) related by Raymond Ibrahim (author of the Al-Qaeda Reader):
A poet, Ka’b ibn Ashraf, offended Muhammad, prompting the latter to exclaim, “Who will kill this man who has hurt God and his prophet?” A young Muslim named Muhammad ibn Maslama volunteered on condition that in order to get close enough to Ka’b to assassinate him, he be allowed to lie to the poet. Muhammad agreed. Ibn Maslama traveled to Ka’b and began to denigrate Islam and Muhammad. He carried on in this way till his disaffection became so convincing that Ka’b took him into his confidence. Soon thereafter, Ibn Maslama appeared with another Muslim and, while Ka’b's guard was down, killed him.
The history of jihad and Islamic expansion is filled with similar stories, and it should not be thought politically incorrect to point out that it is from such a heritage that Jihadists like the Pakistani Taliban and its allies consider themselves derived, and which influences the tactics they consider prudent.
It may be time to initiate a “Team B” approach to analyzing Jihadism, as was recently suggested by Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA) in a letter to President Obama. If such an analysis can take place, it may free us from the political correctness and institutionalized vision which shackle the intelligence community. Such an effort should not be seen as a denigration of the brave men and women who perform intelligence tasks, but rather as an effort to provide additional perspectives, like additional tools in their belts.
Former Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson once said that “Gentlemen do not read each other’s mail,” but once World War II broke out, his opinion changed. The United States has been at war against a Jihadist enemy, since well before 9/11, and while we have long been able to read their mail, but it may well be time to start reading their history books too.