Israel’s Elusive Qualitative Military Edge
By: Kyle Shideler, Senior Research Fellow
The recent announcement of a proposed $30 billion arms deal to Saudi Arabia, which includes 84 F-15E fighter jets, has once again raised questions on whether the United States is honoring its oft-stated commitment to help maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge (QME).
It has long been an unwritten staple of U.S. foreign policy, beginning with President Lyndon Johnson and continuing with every subsequent administration, to ensure that Israel maintains the QME over any likely combination of regional opponents. QME is not simply a question of who has the greatest numbers of guns, tanks, and planes, but, rather, a difficult-to-measure metric of superiority, which includes numbers, technological quality, and military training.
During the Cold War, QME was easier to calculate. Western-made weapons supplied to Israel were visibly superior to the Warsaw Pact weapons that the Soviets supplied to its Arab allies — enough so that Israel prevailed over multiple attackers, as in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, when Israel was able to successfully defend itself from Egypt, Syria, and expeditionary forces from eight other Arab states, despite a surprise attack, the opponents’ overwhelming numbers, and attacks on two fronts.
Since the end of the Cold War, however, QME has become an increasingly elusive goal, especially as the United States has now become both Israel’s and the Arab states’ primary arms dealer, and as the focus has shifted from some combination of the Arab states versus Israel, to the United States, Israel, and some of the Arab states in opposition to the revolutionary Islamist bloc led by Iran, but including Hezbollah, Hamas, and, to some extent, Turkey.
This change in alignment began in the 1980s, and can be seen in the U.S.’ controversial sale of AWACs surveillance planes to Saudi Arabia. Pro-Israel advocates argued, unsuccessfully, that the advanced electronic intelligence gathering and coordination capabilities provided by AWACs would alter Israel’s QME vis-a-vis the Arab states. The U.S. then also sold Saudi Arabia, in 1992, the advanced F-15E fighter, which Israel also opposed unsuccessfully. Other advanced weapons sold to Saudi Arabia have included the M1A2 Abrams tanks and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters.
Traditionally, the sales of arms to the Arab states have utilized less-technologically-advanced versions of the counterpart systems sold to Israel; however, increasingly, the United States has subsequently relented on providing the upgrades on these systems. For example, the U.S. initially refused to provide the Saudi F-15Es with the capability to deploy AMRAAMs (Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles), and also would not provide the Egyptian military with Apache helicopters that included the advanced “longbow” radar system. In both cases, the United States has made these systems available to both states and additional Arab states as well. Even to the extent that the U.S. is conscious about ensuring that Israel receives superior versions of military exports, when it comes to military conflict, as Stalin purportedly said, “quantity has a quality all its own.”
According to the Congressional Research Service, between 1996 and 2003, the United States delivered $24.1 billion in defense articles and services to Saudi Arabia and $9 billion in defense-related items to Egypt. By comparison, Israel received $7.42 billion in deliveries in that period. Even the smaller Gulf nations, such as the United Arab Emirates, have gotten in on the act. The emirates are now the fourth largest arms purchaser in the world, purchasing both defensive systems, such as the Patriot missile defense battery, as well as fighter aircraft and other weapons that provide long-range force- projection capability.
To the extent that the Arab states and Israel are both aligned in opposition to Iran, it could perhaps be argued, as some do, that Israel’s QME is strengthened by such sales. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy wrote in an article, “U.S. Foreign Policy and Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge” (Jan. 2008):
With the anachronistic strategic bifurcation of the Middle East into Israel and a monolithic group of Arab states no longer analytically useful (if it ever was), traditional assumptions regarding QME no longer hold true. For example, the sale of sophisticated conventional weaponry to the Arab states no longer necessarily implies a corresponding reduction in Israel’s QME. Instead, such a sale is a double-edged sword, reducing Israel’s QME to the extent such Arab states continue to represent Israeli adversaries, but at the same time effectively increasing Israel’s QME by improving the military capability of states aligned with it in their desire to deter Iranian threats and aggression.
While this may be true in theory, it is certainly no comfort to the Israelis who deal in reality and who have experienced repeated cases in which weapons intended for use against Iranian proxies Hezbollah and Hamas instead were directed against Israel itself. Excellent examples include the arming of Fatah in the West Bank and the arming of the Lebanese army, given the August 3 border incident.
Lebanon has received $720 million in U.S. military aid since 2006. Since the border incident, in which Lebanese snipers killed Israeli Lt.-Col. Dov Harari and severely injured another officer, members of Congress have threatened to cut off military aid unless assurances are given that the weapons would not be used against Israel. Lebanon’s defense minister replied that Lebanon will not accept the arms unless they can be used against Israel, and Iran has pledged to take over the U.S.’s role.
Even regarding countries with which Israel has long been at peace, there are signs of trouble. As Middle East expert Barry Rubin reports, an overwhelming majority of Arabs view Israel, and not Iran, as the enemy. Eighty-eight percent of those polled consider Israel the enemy, compared to only 10 percent who consider Iran an enemy. While public opinion certainly does not make policy in any Arab regime, it becomes an important factor when considering the long-term effects of weapon sales on Israel’s QME. Israeli (and American) tacticians cannot afford to assume that the regime in power in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, or any other Arab states will remain in power forever. Nor is a regime change solely a long-term question. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is reportedly in very dire health, and the Islamist party Muslim Brotherhood is expected to play an important role in determining his successor. If a regime change occurs in Egypt or elsewhere, Israel has to presume that it will be once again in the cross-hairs.
This can best be seen in the case of Turkey. For many years, Turkey was one of Israel’s staunchest allies, after the United States. Turkish-Israeli military and intelligence cooperation efforts were broad and took place across changes of governments in both countries. Turkey is also a member of NATO and a U.S. ally, which provides Ankara with greater weapons technology and military training than those afforded to any other state in the Middle East.
Turkey has undertaken substantial military modernization since 1996, seeking to procure Western weapons to bring it on par with other NATO members. Turkey at times has met resistance to such purchases due to questions about its human rights treatment of Kurdish civilians, but it has not previously been considered a factor when considering Israel’s QME. Given the Turkish role in the Mavi Marmara incident, its increasing alignment with Iran, and military agreements with Syria, this must no longer be the case, even as Israeli military leadership continues to maintain that the Turkish military is not necessarily an enemy. “Ties with Turkey are important,” IDF Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi said. “Not everything that is happening is acceptable to the [Turkish] military. We must also maintain ties in stormy periods.”
The Italian newspaper Corriere Della Sera recently reported that Turkey may also be joining Iran in arming Hezbollah. Turkey could utilize its NATO armaments to substantially bolster Hezbollah’s military capability. In light of this new development, Turkey must be considered a threat to Israel’s QME in both the short and long term, especially as the Islamist AKP party continues to successfully purge the Turkish military and intelligence services and replace its secularist traditions with Islamist ideology.
Given the uncertain future of Turkey and its increased alignment with the revolutionary Islamist bloc led by Iran, Ankara’s continued involvement in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter project represents a deep concern. Michael Rubin at National Review writes:
Precisely because the F-35 will be the fighter the U.S. Air Force will most depend on to maintain air superiority in the decades ahead, the decision to sell F-35s to Turkey, whose future foreign policy orientation is in question, should be reviewed by appropriate Defense Department elements to assess possible loss of critical technology to states of concern. Congress should mandate that review, specify that it be completed within the year, and then make it available to the appropriate committees of Congress.
As the project stands, Turkey will be able to locally produce the F-35 under license at its Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) facilities, and is expected to order as many as 120 of the fifth-generation fighter jet. By comparison, Israel has suffered continued setbacks in its efforts to procure the F-35, with hang- ups including the need to install Israeli electronics as well as the need to be able to locally repair and refurbish the aircraft. Both are standard operating procedure for Israel, and an important part of how Israel maintains QME, so American resistance to these requests represents a disturbing new development. Israel hopes to eventually procure around 100 F-35s.
If Israel only having F-35-related procurement difficulties with the United States, it would have less to worry about, as other countries, including Britain and Australia, have faced similar difficulties with the F-35 program. However, according to a Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) report on Israel’s QME, the Obama administration has blocked sales of weapons to Israel, while allowing the same items to be acquired by Arab states. The JINSA report, “The Qualitative Military Edge: What is it and Where has it Gone” says:
Indeed, Israel’s request for six AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters was blocked by the Obama Administration in June — the same time the Egyptian sale was approved. U.S. sources reported that the request was undergoing an “interagency review to determine whether additional Longbow helicopters would threaten Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip.” “During the recent war, Israel made considerable use of the Longbow, and there were high civilian casualties in the Gaza Strip,” a source close to the administration was reported to have said.
Additionally, other reports have alleged that Israel requests for other important military articles, including Harpoon anti-ship missiles and bunker-busting bombs, were being deliberately delayed. If so, this adds a new element of Israel’s struggle to maintain QME.
Israel’s QME remains as elusive as ever, even while the importance, both for Israel and the United States, of maintaining that edge continues to grow. In Lebanon, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and once-stalwart ally Turkey, America cannot assume that arms it provides will not be directed towards its Israeli ally.
U.S. law 2776, Reports and certifications to Congress on military exports, requires that the administration certify to Congress that any arms deal will not negatively affect Israel’s qualitative military edge:
Any certification relating to a proposed sale or export of defense articles or defense services under this section to any country in the Middle East other than Israel shall include a determination that the sale or export of the defense articles or defense services will not adversely affect Israel’s qualitative military edge over military threats to Israel.
If the Obama administration does not take into account these changing dynamics in the Middle East, no certification regarding Israeli’s QME provided to Congress could possibly be considered reliable, nor would it provide comfort to pro-Israel legislators wishing to vote for the Saudi F-15 deal or future Middle East arms deals.